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EFFECT OF COHABITATION ON ALIMONY 
EMILY M. MAY† 
ABSTRACT 
  As nonmarital cohabitation has skyrocketed over the last several 
decades, courts and legislatures have increasingly struggled to decide 
what legal effect an ex-spouse’s cohabitation with a new partner 
should have on the receipt of alimony payments. In seeking to answer 
this cohabitation question, states have taken a variety of approaches. 
Often, however, courts’ answers to the cohabitation question are not 
grounded in the rationale that those courts used to award alimony in 
the first place and may therefore lead to inconsistent or absurd results. 
This Note addresses the cohabitation question and argues that states 
should revisit their current approaches in light of the multiple 
contemporary theories of alimony and twenty-first century social-
science research on cohabitation. Ultimately, this Note proposes 
several clarifications to existing law in order to provide a sensible, 
workable rule that would introduce consistency to courts’ 
considerations of the cohabitation question. 
INTRODUCTION 
When Patricia and Andrew Craissati divorced in 2001, a Florida 
court ordered Andrew to pay Patricia alimony for eight years.1 The 
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 1. Craissati v. Craissati, 997 So. 2d 458, 458–59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). This Note uses 
the traditional term “alimony” to refer to post-divorce payments that are not part of the 
distribution of property at divorce. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 85 (9th ed. 2009) (defining 
“alimony” as “[a] court-ordered allowance that one spouse pays to the other spouse for 
maintenance and support while they are separated, while they are involved in a matrimonial 
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court directed Patricia’s alimony to terminate, however, if she 
“cohabit[ed] with another person other than the parties’ child.”2 
Later, Patricia was sentenced to nine years in prison for driving under 
the influence, causing serious bodily injury, and leaving the scene of 
an accident.3 Andrew filed a petition to modify the alimony payments, 
alleging that Patricia was “cohabiting” in violation of the original 
court order because she shared her prison cell with a fellow inmate.4 
The trial court recognized that to construe cohabitation to 
include a prison inmate would be “absurd” and “unthinkably 
bizarre.”5 Instead, the trial court found that Patricia’s alimony should 
be reduced because she had diminished financial need while 
incarcerated.6 The appellate court, however, disagreed with the lower 
court’s reasoning.7 It did not think that labeling Patricia as a 
cohabitant was “absurd” because Patricia had stipulated in an 
evidentiary hearing that her incarceration technically amounted to 
cohabitation and that she had voluntarily driven under the influence.8 
The appellate court thus reversed the trial court’s decision and 
directed the court on remand to terminate Patricia’s alimony.9 
Although Patricia needed less alimony because she was 
incarcerated, she did not cohabit as the term is generally understood.10 
And although Patricia’s situation is unusual, she is not alone in losing 
 
lawsuit, or after they are divorced,” and distinguishing it from property settlement, as 
“[a]limony payments are taxable income to the receiving spouse and are deductible by the payor 
spouse; payments in settlement of property rights are not”). More modern terms—such as 
“spousal support” and “maintenance”—are generally synonymous this Note’s use of the term 
“alimony.” 
 2. Craissati, 997 So. 2d at 459. The court incorporated the couple’s separation agreement 
into its final judgment, and the separation agreement defined cohabitation as “the Wife living 
with another person (not including the parties’ child) for a period of 3 (three) consecutive 
months or more.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting the separation agreement). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 460. 
 8. Id. at 459–60. 
 9. Id. at 460. 
 10. As discussed in Part III, infra, courts and legislatures do not agree on one definition of 
cohabitation. Generally, however, two people in a sexual or otherwise romantic relationship 
must live together for a certain period of time without being married in order to be considered 
unmarried cohabitants. Further, Black’s Law Dictionary defines cohabitation as “[t]he fact or 
state of living together, esp. as partners in life, usu. with the suggestion of sexual relations.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 296 (9th ed. 2009). 
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her alimony on the ground of cohabitation. As cohabitation outside 
of marriage becomes both more prevalent and more socially 
acceptable, courts increasingly confront the question of what legal 
effect an ex-spouse’s cohabitation should have on her alimony 
payments.11 
Legal scholarship, by contrast, has not addressed the question in 
sufficient depth. Indeed, the social landscape has changed 
dramatically since scholars first explored this topic in the 1970s.12 For 
example, between 1970 and 2000, the number of cohabiting couples 
increased tenfold.13 Although some recent work has addressed the 
question as it applies to a specific state,14 academics have not 
thoroughly explored the issue in connection with alimony’s 
theoretical framework and twenty-first century social-science 
research on cohabitation.15 Because alimony reform remains 
ongoing,16 this topic is ripe for further discussion and debate. 
 
 11. This Note presumes that the typical alimony recipient is a woman. Although alimony is 
available to both men and women, Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979), courts continue to 
award alimony to women much more often than they award it to men, JOHN DE WITT 
GREGORY, PETER N. SWISHER & SHERYL L. WOLF, UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW 322 (3d 
ed. 2005). Indeed, in 2010, 97 percent of alimony recipients were female. See U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics & U.S. Census Bureau, Source of Income in 2010—Number with Income and 
Mean Income of Specified Type in 2010 of People 15 Years Old and Over, by Age, Race, and 
Hispanic Origin, and Sex: Both Sexes, 15 Years and Over, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://
www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstables/032011/perinc/new09_001.htm (last updated Sept. 13, 
2011) (reporting that 392,000 adults received alimony in 2010); U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
& U.S. Census Bureau, Source of Income in 2010—Number with Income and Mean Income of 
Specified Type in 2010 of People 15 Years Old and Over, by Age, Race, Hispanic Origin, and 
Sex: Female, 15 Years and Over, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/
cpstables/032011/perinc/new09_013.htm (last updated Sept. 13, 2011) (reporting that 380,000 
alimony recipients in 2010 were women). 
 12. Professor J. Thomas Oldham was one of the first scholars to address this question. See 
generally J. Thomas Oldham, The Effect of Unmarried Cohabitation by a Former Spouse upon 
His or Her Right To Continue To Receive Alimony, 17 J. FAM. L. 249 (1978) (addressing judicial 
and legislative responses to the legal effect of cohabitation on alimony). 
 13. See infra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 14. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Ciancio & Jamie L. Rutten, Modifying or Terminating Maintenance 
Based on Cohabitation, 38 COLO. LAW., June 2009, at 45 (exploring the legal effect of 
cohabitation on alimony in Colorado); Peter L. Gladstone & Andrea E. Gladstone, Codifying 
Cohabitation as a Ground for Modification or Termination of Alimony—So What’s New?, 80 
FLA. B.J., Mar. 2006, at 45 (discussing Florida’s enactment of a statute that addresses the legal 
effect of cohabitation on alimony); Allan L. Karnes, Terminating Maintenance Payments When 
an Ex-Spouse Cohabits in Illinois: When Is Enough Enough?, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 435 
(2008) (exploring the legal effect of cohabitation on alimony in Illinois). 
 15. The social-science research on the frequency and duration of cohabitation as well as the 
research on the extent to which cohabitation affects an alimony recipient’s financial need has 
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This Note addresses the “cohabitation question”—the issue of 
what legal effect an ex-spouse’s cohabitation with a new partner 
should have on her right to receive alimony payments—and argues 
that states should revisit their current rules in light of both the 
multiple contemporary theories of alimony and the contemporary 
social-science research on cohabitation. Part I discusses the history of 
and justifications for alimony. Part II then presents social-science 
research on cohabitation. Part III explores the relevant statutes and 
case law across jurisdictions. Finally, Part IV identifies problems with 
states’ current rules and proposes several clarifications. First, only if a 
judge awards alimony based on need—as opposed to a different 
reason—should cohabitation affect alimony payments. Second, states 
should define cohabitation and financial need to avoid excessive 
judicial discretion that can lead to inconsistent and absurd results. 
Third, in situations in which alimony modification is warranted due to 
an ex-spouse’s cohabitation, a judge should at most suspend, not 
terminate, alimony payments. Although these changes do not answer 
every aspect of the complicated cohabitation question, this Note 
seeks to provide a necessary first step in exposing problems and 
clarifying the law. 
I.  CONFLICTING THEORIES OF ALIMONY 
Courts’ and legislatures’ responses to the cohabitation question 
should be consistent with why courts award alimony in the first place. 
This Part traces the historical development of alimony and explains 
why alimony’s original justification does not apply to divorces in the 
twenty-first century. It then analyzes the various contemporary 
theories of alimony and how courts apply them. Finally, this Part 
discusses the practical significance of these multiple theories. 
 
implications for how courts and legislatures should respond to this question in the twenty-first 
century. See infra Part II.A–B. 
 16. Advocates for change tend to support firmer limits on alimony payments. See, e.g., 
Jennifer Levitz, The New Art of Alimony, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2009, at W1 (“Long viewed as 
payment for life, divorce settlements are facing strict new limits as some ex-spouses—primarily 
men—protest the endless support of a former partner.”). 
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A. Alimony’s Complicated History 
The American conception of alimony traces back to England’s 
ecclesiastical courts.17 Prior to 1857, there were two ways to end a 
marriage in England: absolute divorce and limited divorce.18 Only an 
act of Parliament could sanction an absolute divorce (divorce vincula 
matrimonii), and such acts were incredibly rare.19 Ecclesiastical courts 
could, however, grant limited divorces.20 Limited divorces, commonly 
known as “divorce from bed and board” (divorce a mensa et thoro), 
resembled modern legal separations.21 They thus did not end the 
husband’s legal duty to support his wife.22 Given the husband’s 
ongoing legal obligation after a limited divorce, the courts awarded 
alimony to provide maintenance for the wife.23 Because the law 
forbade married women from owning certain property, pursuing most 
employment opportunities, and keeping the money they earned, 
alimony often served as a necessary lifeline.24 
Ecclesiastical judges had significant discretion in determining 
alimony awards.25 The wife’s need and the husband’s ability to 
support her were the most important considerations in the 
ecclesiastical courts.26 They also considered the husband’s degree of 
 
 17. Robert Kirkman Collins, The Theory of Marital Residuals: Applying an Income 
Adjustment Calculus to the Enigma of Alimony, 24 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 23, 28 (2001); Chester 
G. Vernier & John B. Hurlbut, The Historical Background of Alimony Law and Its Present 
Statutory Structure, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 197 (1939). 
 18. Collins, supra note 17, at 28. Ecclesiastical courts could also annul a marriage based on 
an impediment in existence when the couple married. Vernier & Hurlbut, supra note 17, at 197–
98. 
 19. Vernier & Hurlbut, supra note 17, at 198; see also GREGORY ET AL., supra note 11, at 
262 (“[A]bsolute divorce, or divorce from the bonds of matrimony, . . . terminates the parties’ 
marital status.”). This type of divorce was granted only 317 times in the 150 years preceding the 
Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85 (Eng.); Collins, supra note 17, at 
28–29. 
 20. Collins, supra note 17, at 28. 
 21. Id. Courts granted this type of limited marital termination in cases of adultery and 
cruelty. Vernier & Hurlbut, supra note 17, at 197. 
 22. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 619 (2d ed. 1988) (“The alimony which was awarded by the ecclesiastical 
courts . . . merely constituted a recognition and enforcement of the husband’s duty to support 
the wife which continued after judicial separation.”). 
 23. Vernier & Hurlbut, supra note 17, at 198. 
 24. Collins, supra note 17, at 29. The word alimony comes from the Latin term “alimonia,” 
meaning sustenance. Cynthia Lee Starnes, One More Time: Alimony, Intuition, and the 
Remarriage-Termination Rule, 81 IND. L.J. 971, 983 (2006). 
 25. Vernier & Hurlbut, supra note 17, at 198. 
 26. Id. at 198–99. 
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fault in the dissolution of the marriage.27 Some ecclesiastical judges 
increased the amount of alimony to punish a morally culpable or 
delinquent husband.28 If a judge found that the wife had committed 
marital misconduct, however, she generally did not receive alimony.29 
Additionally, judges freely modified alimony awards upon a showing 
of changed circumstances.30 
When absolute divorce became more readily available after mid-
nineteenth century reforms, English judges began frequently 
awarding alimony in absolute divorce cases.31 The courts did not 
provide a coherent theory, however, to explain why alimony should 
be granted in an absolute divorce when the duty to support had 
supposedly terminated.32 American courts likewise imported the 
concept of alimony in the context of absolute divorce, but they faced 
the same conceptual difficulty. American courts awarded alimony 
without explaining why husbands, as opposed to the state, should 
support their wives after the court terminated the husband’s legal 
duty to support.33 Certainly, the state benefited from imposing this 
duty to support because alimony reduced the possibility that the ex-
wife would become a ward of the state.34 Nevertheless, courts 
awarding alimony continued to balance the wife’s need with the 
husband’s ability to pay.35 And by the late 1930s, every American 
jurisdiction, with the exception of South Carolina, had a statute 
providing for alimony upon absolute divorce.36 
 
 27. CLARK, supra note 22, at 619. 
 28. Vernier & Hurlbut, supra note 17, at 199. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 201. 
 31. Collins, supra note 17, at 30. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See id. (“The same inattention to theoretical consistency regarding support after a 
severance of the marital bond appears to have marked the progress of alimony on this side of 
the Atlantic.”); see also David A. Hardy, Nevada Alimony: An Important Policy in Need of a 
Coherent Policy Purpose, 9 NEV. L.J. 325, 329 (2009) (“The analytical framework for alimony 
began to lose constancy with the end of coverture and advent of absolute divorce.”). 
 34. JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW AND 
THE FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 195 (2011). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Vernier & Hurlbut, supra note 17, at 201. South Carolina did not provide for divorce 
until 1949. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 161; see also Act effective Apr. 15, 1949, 
No. 137, 1949 S.C. Acts 216 (allowing for “divorce from the bonds of matrimony”). 
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During the early twentieth century, American judges based 
divorce on fault,37 which provided a partial explanation for alimony’s 
persistence.38 The number of official grounds for divorce varied 
among the states, but all states that permitted divorce included 
adultery as a ground for divorce, most awarded divorce on the 
grounds of desertion and cruelty, and some awarded divorce for 
nonsupport.39 Findings of fault affected whether, and in what amount, 
courts awarded alimony.40 Indeed, similar to the historical practice in 
England, the husband’s marital misconduct tended to increase the 
wife’s alimony award,41 and courts generally did not award alimony to 
“guilty” wives.42 
Over time, demand for divorce increased, and opposition to 
“easy divorce” decreased.43 Although the official law of divorce 
changed little in the first half of the twentieth century, “[s]lowly, a 
kind of creeping no-fault system began to emerge.”44 Prior to the 
advent of no-fault divorce, couples would circumvent statutory 
restraints by lying about the existence of one of the statutory grounds 
for divorce in their state.45 The statutory law began to catch up with 
this collusive behavior in 1970.46 That year, California enacted the first 
no-fault divorce statute.47 Other states soon followed, and all states 
 
 37. Id. 
 38. Starnes, supra note 24, at 985. Although the fault-based rationale could explain some 
alimony awards, that rationale only explains why a “guilty” spouse would pay alimony to an 
“innocent” spouse. Id. 
 39. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 161. The issuance of divorce in practice 
sometimes differed from the statutorily accepted grounds and the articulated policy rationales. 
See id. at 163 (“The formal official law . . . had absolutely no relationship to what was happening 
on the ground. . . . [D]ivorce was a matter of routine—courts simply acted as rubber 
stamps; . . . a messy system of lies and collusion was in effect; and judges, for the most part, 
buried their heads in the sand.”). 
 40. Id. at 195. 
 41. Edward W. Cooey, The Exercise of Judicial Discretion in the Award of Alimony, 6 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 213, 219–20 (1939). 
 42. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 195. 
 43. Id. at 163–64. 
 44. Id. at 172. 
 45. See id. at 167–68 (describing examples of such collusion, including faked evidence of 
adultery, in New York). 
 46. See id. at 176 (“The legal story of divorce in the twentieth century was basically of how 
this dual system decayed—at first rather slowly, then, after 1970, in almost a helter-skelter 
rush.”). 
 47. Id.; see also Act of Sept. 4, 1969, ch. 1608, § 4506, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3313, 3324 (current 
version at CAL. FAM. CODE § 2310 (West 2004)) (listing “[i]reconcilable differences” as a 
ground for divorce). 
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now have no-fault divorce.48 Alimony, however, survived the no-fault-
divorce revolution.49 On the one hand, alimony’s continued existence 
makes little sense because no-fault divorce once again confirmed, at 
least in principle, that divorce results in a clean break and thus 
terminates a spouse’s ongoing duty to support.50 Yet, on the other 
hand, its persistence is reasonable because property distribution and 
alimony awards are closely related. Property distribution alone may 
be inadequate to support an ex-spouse because many couples do not 
have sufficient capital assets.51 Further, dependent spouses may have 
a need for alimony regardless of whether fault is considered in 
divorce proceedings. Indeed, divorce often results in “economic 
disaster” for women.52 
In the twenty-first century, alimony statutes continue to 
authorize judges to make awards in equity.53 Concurrently, however, 
couples increasingly choose to craft separation agreements.54 These 
agreements enable spouses to agree contractually on many different 
issues, including property distribution and alimony.55 Although courts 
historically reviewed these agreements with suspicion, they now 
afford them substantial deference to promote more amicable 
divorces.56 
 
 48. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 177–78. New York, the last state to resist 
the no-fault divorce movement, finally joined the other states in 2010. Id. at 178; see also 
Domestic Relations Law—No Fault Divorce, ch. 384, § 1(7), 2010 N.Y. Laws Reg. Sess. 1169, 
1169 (codified at N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(7) (McKinney 2010)) (allowing for divorce if 
“[t]he relationship between husband and wife has broken down irretrievably for a period of at 
least six months”). 
 49. Interestingly, twenty-two states still authorize judges to consider fault when 
determining alimony awards. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 209; see also, e.g., 
Mani v. Mani, 869 A.2d 904, 917 (N.J. 2005) (“[W]e hold that to the extent that marital 
misconduct affects the economic status quo of the parties, it may be taken into consideration in 
the calculation of alimony.”). 
 50. Starnes, supra note 24, at 988. 
 51. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 26 (2002) (“Few divorcing couples have capital assets sufficiently 
large to provide an adequate substitute for any but the most modest of alimony awards.”). 
 52. ALISON CLARKE-STEWART & CORNELIA BRENTANO, DIVORCE: CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES 96–97 (2006). 
 53. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 204. 
 54. Id. at 212. Today, at least half of divorcing couples use separation agreements. Id. at 
213. 
 55. GREGORY ET AL., supra note 11, at 111. 
 56. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 213. 
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And although courts award alimony less frequently than they did 
in the past,57 they continue to award it in a significant number of 
cases. In 2010, approximately 392,000 adults received alimony 
payments.58 The median amount of alimony received was $8,279 per 
year.59 Ninety-seven percent of alimony recipients were female,60 and 
73 percent of female alimony recipients were aged forty-five or 
older.61 
B. Alimony’s Various Contemporary Justifications 
Many legal scholars and practitioners remain in favor of alimony 
even though it lacks a dominant, accepted theoretical framework.62 
Nevertheless, scholars acknowledge that the law of alimony needs 
theoretical justification in order to promote consistency and 
 
 57. Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recognition of Gender Difference in the Law: 
Revaluing the Caretaker Role, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 23 (2008). Unfortunately, 
comprehensive national data on the percentage of divorced women receiving alimony are 
unavailable because the U.S. Census Bureau stopped collecting state data about divorce in 1995. 
GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 204. In 1990, 15.5 percent of divorced or separated 
women were awarded alimony. GORDON H. LESTER, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, SER. P-60, NO. 173, CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY: 1989, at 12 (1991), available at 
http://www2.census.gov/prod2/popscan/p60-173.pdf. 
 58. See supra note 11. 
 59. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics & U.S. Census Bureau, Source of Income in 2010—
People 15 Years Old and Over, by Income of Specified Type in 2010, Age, Race, Hispanic Origin, 
and Sex: Both Sexes, 15 Years and Over, All Races, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstables/
032011/perinc/new08_001.htm (last updated Sept. 13, 2011). The mean value received was 
$12,993 per year. Id. 
 60. See supra note 11. 
 61. Of the 380,000 female alimony recipients in 2010, 220,000 were between the ages of 
forty-five and sixty-four, and 58,000 were sixty-five or older. See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
& U.S. Census Bureau, Source of Income in 2010—Number with Income and Mean Income of 
Specified Type in 2010 of People 15 Years Old and Over, by Age, Race, and Hispanic Origin, and 
Sex: Female, 45 to 64 Years, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstables/
032011/perinc/new09_017.htm (last updated Sept. 13, 2011) (providing income statistics for 
women between the ages of forty-five and sixty-four); U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics & U.S. 
Census Bureau, Source of Income in 2010—Number with Income and Mean Income of Specified 
Type in 2010 of People 15 Years Old and Over, by Age, Race, and Hispanic Origin, and Sex: 
Female, 65 Years and Over, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstables/
032011/perinc/new09_018.htm (last updated Sept. 13, 2011) (providing income statistics for 
women sixty-five years of age or older); supra note 11. 
 62. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 51, at 24–25 (“At least in long-term marriages 
one . . . finds a widespread view that marital dissolution should not dissolve all financial ties 
between the former spouses if the result would be a significant disparity in the spouses’ post-
dissolution financial standing. However this apparent consensus exists only in very general 
terms, and has produced no dominant theory to explain the alimony award.”). 
MAY IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/19/2012  9:38 AM 
412 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:403 
predictability.63 Some scholars continue to support the traditional 
need-based rationale whereas some borrow from contract or 
partnership principles. Others explain alimony as compensation for 
economic losses. These theories exist simultaneously both in the 
academic literature and, to varying degrees, in statutes and judicial 
decisions. 
This Note recognizes that courts award alimony for different 
reasons in different situations and discusses the cohabitation question 
within this complicated theoretical framework. Certainly, the 
existence of multiple alimony theories is problematic because it may 
lead to unpredictability and inconsistency, especially if courts and 
scholars do not agree on when to rely on different theoretical bases 
for awarding alimony. This Note does not, however, attempt to pick 
one theory that courts should apply in all situations. The reality is that 
courts and legislatures apply different theories in different contexts. 
And indeed, the existence of different theories for different contexts 
has some benefits. The detriments of one theory might have little 
impact in one context whereas they could render an alimony award 
inapposite in another context. An ex-spouse with a modest post-
divorce income, for example, might not need alimony to provide for 
basic expenditures, but she may have suffered economic losses as a 
result of her marriage and therefore deserve compensation. The 
advantages and disadvantages of each theory are thus important as 
they indicate when judges might apply one theory instead of another. 
The reason that a judge awards alimony is relevant to answering the 
cohabitation question. What follows is a brief description of the 
various theories courts reference in making decisions about alimony. 
1. Need.  Many courts and statutes continue to emphasize that 
alimony depends on the financial need of the recipient and on the 
supporting spouse’s ability to pay.64 Continuing to apply the need-
 
 63. See, e.g., id. at 27 (“The absence of any systematic theory of alimony in modern divorce 
law presents difficulties that extend to the law of marital property. The law of alimony needs a 
justification that can support a law operating more consistently, more reliably, and more 
predictably.”). 
 64. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-16.3A(a) (West 2000) (“The court shall award 
alimony to the dependent spouse upon a finding that one spouse is a dependent spouse, that the 
other spouse is a supporting spouse and that an award of alimony is equitable after considering 
all relevant factors . . . .”); Gayet v. Gayet, 456 A.2d 102, 103 (N.J. 1983) (“[T]he court must 
consider, among other factors, ‘the actual need and ability to pay of the parties . . . .’” (quoting 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (1980))). 
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based theory in the wake of no-fault divorce makes some sense 
because the specialization of labor within a marriage may contribute 
to a spouse’s need upon divorce. A spouse who takes a less lucrative 
job or puts her career on hold to care for children—even for only a 
few years—will probably never recover her lost earning capacity and 
may thus need alimony.65 If a woman divorces at a relatively young 
age, she may have small children and still need to juggle work and 
family.66 Alternatively, if an ex-spouse has been out of the workforce 
for many years, prospective employers may find that she has little 
market value because she has limited recent work experience outside 
the home.67 Thus, because this theory focuses on the ex-spouse’s 
financial need,68 ex-spouses who do not actually need alimony—even 
if they incurred opportunity costs during their marriage—would not 
qualify for alimony under this theory.69 
Critics of the need-based theory highlight two principal 
difficulties. First, there is no clear definition of what level of support 
satisfies “need.”70 Decisions variously conflate need with subsistence, 
with a middle-class lifestyle, or with the prior marital standard of 
living.71 Second, the need-based approach may not explain 
satisfactorily why the ex-spouse, as opposed to the state or another 
entity, should provide continuing support in the wake of no-fault 
divorce.72 
2. Contract and Partnership.  The contract and partnership 
theories help to explain why the ex-spouse, as opposed to another 
entity, should be obligated to support the other ex-spouse after a 
 
 65. Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with 
Dolls, Partnership Buyouts, and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 67, 81 (1993); 
see also Jacob Mincer & Solomon Polachek, Family Investments in Human Capital: Earnings of 
Women, in NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY: MARRIAGE, 
CHILDREN, AND HUMAN CAPITAL 397, 415 (Theodore W. Schultz ed., 1973), available at http://
www.nber.org/chapters/c2973.pdf (noting that increased time spent at home results in a “net 
depreciation of earning power”). 
 66. Starnes, supra note 65, at 82. 
 67. Id. at 81. 
 68. Collins, supra note 17, at 40. 
 69. This focus on need instead of on loss distinguishes the need-based theory from the 
economic-damages approach discussed infra, Part I.B.3. 
 70. Collins, supra note 17, at 41 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ira Mark 
Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 4 (1989) (“[T]he definition of ‘need’—the 
most fundamental issue created by [alimony] statutes—is hopelessly confused.”). 
 71. Ellman, supra note 70, at 4. 
 72. Collins, supra note 17, at 40–41. 
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divorce. The idea that ex-spouses deserve alimony based on one of 
these theories is thus in part pragmatic. These theories borrow from 
already-established legal principles. Both, however, have deficiencies. 
The law generally treats marriage as a species of contract.73 
Indeed, the contractual rights and duties of spouses can be inferred 
from the marriage vows.74 Although the specific rights and duties to 
which the spouses contract may depend on each spouse’s subculture 
and social class, the spouses essentially contract for future spousal 
services.75 Parties to the marriage contract include not only the 
spouses, but also the state.76 The state’s presence as a party explains 
why it can confer duties and benefits as well as determine when the 
marriage ends.77 The contract approach construes divorce as a breach 
of the marriage contract and alimony as damages for that breach.78 
Unfortunately, contract theory may not provide justification for all 
instances in which courts award alimony.79 Some scholars also say that 
the contract theory’s conception of damages is problematic. The idea 
that one party has breached the marriage contract does not easily fit 
within the no-fault framework. And even if no-fault divorce did not 
complicate this theory, the contract approach often does not prescribe 
an appropriate amount or duration for alimony payments.80 
The partnership theory also adopts existing legal principles, but 
it does not share some of the contract theory’s weaknesses. A 
significant body of scholarship supports the view that marriage is an 
economic partnership.81 According to one proponent, partnership 
theory is a “richer” model than the contract approach and has 
significant normative appeal because it is based on an egalitarian 
framework.82 Under the partnership approach, divorce does not 
 
 73. GREGORY ET AL., supra note 11, at 33. 
 74. Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce, and Quasi Rents; Or “I Gave Him the Best Years of 
My Life,” 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267, 272 (1987). 
 75. Id. at 273. 
 76. GREGORY ET AL., supra note 11, at 33. 
 77. Id. at 33–34. 
 78. Collins, supra note 17, at 42. 
 79. Treating marriages as contracts may work better in cases in which the parties entered 
into a written prenuptial agreement. Ellman, supra note 70, at 32. Indeed, some scholars 
strongly criticize the contract approach in the absence of a written agreement. See, e.g., id. at 33 
(arguing that applying contract principles “is no more than a concealed way of vindicating the 
court’s own preferences” and only “purport[s] to follow the parties’ intentions”). 
 80. Collins, supra note 17, at 42. 
 81. Id. at 43 & n.94. 
 82. Starnes, supra note 65, at 119. 
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automatically terminate the couple’s shared marital enterprise. 
Rather, the spouse who earns less should receive a “buyout” because 
divorce is a dissolution of the partnership.83 The analogy to a 
partnership accounts for the specialization of labor within a marriage. 
Critics note, however, that many of the default rules of business 
partnership law may not apply to spouses.84 In practice, courts 
generally do not explicitly apply partnership principles in divorce 
proceedings.85 
3. Economic Damages or Compensation.  This theory focuses on 
the spouse’s economic damages that stem from the marriage itself. 
The American Law Institute (ALI) adopted this basic idea: Alimony 
serves as compensation for economic losses, not as payment for 
future need.86 To a certain extent this approach may resemble the 
partnership theory, but it does not share the same problems. 
Although states have not officially adopted this theory as the 
dominant framework,87 courts do apply it in some circumstances. For 
example, a majority of jurisdictions emphasize the spouse’s economic 
damages in “diploma dilemma” cases.88 In those cases, one spouse has 
sacrificed career opportunities to support the other spouse’s schooling 
but never realizes any financial benefits because the couple divorces 
shortly after the other spouse graduates.89 Most states hold that the 
spouse who sacrificed career opportunities has a right to be 
compensated for her financial contributions to the professional 
 
 83. Id. at 139. 
 84. Ellman, supra note 70, at 40. 
 85. Collins, supra note 17, at 43. 
 86. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 51, § 5.02 cmt. a (referring to alimony as both a 
“residual category” of financial awards unrelated to spousal support and as “compensatory 
payments”). Scholars articulated economic-loss-based theories well before the ALI published its 
recommendations. See, e.g., Elisabeth M. Landes, Economics of Alimony, 7 J. LEGAL. STUD. 35, 
63 (1978) (“The empirical results in this paper suggest that the alimony system, as administered, 
acts to compensate wives for their opportunity costs incurred by entering and investing in 
marriage. This interpretation of the economic function of alimony is directly opposed to the 
common allegation that alimony is an ‘anachronistic’ manifestation of the wife’s dependency 
upon her husband.”). 
 87. Hardy, supra note 33, at 334. 
 88. See, e.g., Guy v. Guy, 736 So. 2d 1042, 1046–47 (Miss. 1999) (“We adopt a similar 
approach [to other jurisdictions], allowing the supporting spouse to be reimbursed for putting 
the student spouse through school where the supported spouse obtained a degree and then 
leaves the supporting spouse.”). 
 89. Downs v. Downs, 574 A.2d 156, 157 (Vt. 1990). 
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education of the other spouse.90 Some courts have also applied a 
compensation rationale when the ex-spouse has worked as a 
homemaker in a marriage of long duration.91 Moreover, some alimony 
statutes now explicitly recognize homemaker contributions.92 
4. Practical Implications.  As suggested by the preceding 
discussion of the modern theories behind alimony awards, courts and 
legislatures do not follow one model all the time. Pure “at law” 
remedies—such as damages for breach of the marriage contract—do 
not support awards in all situations in which alimony is awarded. 
Alimony statutes thus incorporate significant discretion and often 
blend alimony theories. Tennessee’s statute, for example, directs 
courts to consider both need and homemaker contributions, among 
other factors, in determining alimony.93 
This Note argues that the reason a court awarded alimony in the 
first place should inform a subsequent decision to modify the alimony 
award. This argument is grounded in two principal concerns. First, to 
the extent feasible under a system in which judges award alimony in 
equity,94 awards should be consistent to serve those equitable 
purposes. The parties should understand why a court awarded 
alimony and be able to predict under what circumstances payments 
will end. The parties should feel that they are treated fairly when 
compared to other divorcing couples. Second, without a theoretical 
basis for their decisions, courts and legislatures may be more likely to 
incorporate moral, rather than legal, judgments into their alimony 
rulings. Thus, the justifications that courts use in awarding alimony 
should be an important factor in determining the legal effect of 
 
 90. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Francis, 442 N.W.2d 59, 62 (Iowa 1989) (holding that a 
spouse who supports the other spouse through professional school should be compensated); 
Guy, 736 So. 2d at 1046–47 (same); Bold v. Bold, 574 A.2d 552, 556 (Pa. 1990) (same); 
Washburn v. Washburn, 677 P.2d 152, 153 (Wash. 1984) (en banc) (same). 
 91. See, e.g., Clapp v. Clapp, 653 A.2d 72, 74 (Vt. 1994) (holding that “one purpose of 
maintenance under [Vermont’s alimony statute, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 752(a) (1993)] is to 
compensate a homemaker for contributions to family well-being not otherwise recognized in the 
property distribution”). 
 92. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-5-121(i)(10) (2010 & Supp. 2011) (stating that courts 
should consider “[t]he extent to which each party has made such tangible and intangible 
contributions to the marriage as monetary and homemaker contributions, and tangible and 
intangible contributions by a party to the education, training, or increased earning power of the 
other party”). 
 93. Id. § 36-5-121(i). 
 94. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
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cohabitation on alimony. The effect of specific theories on the 
cohabitation question is discussed in Part IV. 
Before proceeding, it should be noted that nearly every 
jurisdiction terminates alimony payments if the recipient remarries.95 
Indeed, many state statutes explicitly authorize the termination of 
alimony upon remarriage.96 Although the remarriage-termination rule 
is outside the scope of this Note, it raises related questions. As long as 
alimony remains need-based and tied to the spousal duty to support, 
courts may have reason to terminate alimony upon a recipient’s 
remarriage. To the extent that alimony is based on a different 
rationale—be it contract, partnership, or economic-damages 
theories—even the remarriage-termination rule may no longer be 
justified.97 
II.  DYNAMIC COHABITATION NORMS AND OUTDATED LAWS 
Although cohabitation has traditionally been an uncommon 
phenomenon in the fabric of American life, the frequency and 
acceptance of cohabitation have risen dramatically since 1970. 
Although most states no longer criminalize cohabitation, they also 
generally do not afford significant legal protections to cohabitants. 
Both the recent social-science research and the lack of legal 
protections for cohabitants should influence how states answer the 
cohabitation question.98 
 
 95. CLARK, supra note 22, at 665. 
 96. Starnes, supra note 24, at 977; see also, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-327(B) (2007) 
(“Unless otherwise agreed to in writing or expressly provided in the decree, the obligation to 
pay future maintenance is terminated on . . . the remarriage of the party receiving 
maintenance.”). 
 97. For a more thorough treatment of the remarriage-termination rule, see generally 
Starnes, supra note 24. 
 98. Considering social-science data is especially desirable in this context. To understand 
the practical effect any answer to the cohabitation question will have on ex-spouses, courts and 
legislatures must understand the realities of cohabitation in the twenty-first century. This is 
necessary because alimony rulings are always dependent on the realities of ex-spouses’ social 
and economic relationships. Therefore, if courts adjust their understanding of the consequences 
of cohabitation, as recent social-science research would suggest, see infra Part II, then courts 
should also adjust their application of the various theories of alimony in the cohabitation 
context, see infra Part IV. 
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A. The Increasing Prevalence and Acceptance of Cohabitation 
Scholars use various descriptions—from “meteoric”99 to 
“extraordinary”100 to “one of the remarkable social changes of our 
era”101—to convey the rise in cohabitation over the last few decades. 
Although in the past the great majority of Americans either married 
or remained single, the social landscape now looks markedly 
different.102 Between 1970 and 2000, the number of cohabiting couples 
increased tenfold: Whereas approximately 500,000 couples cohabited 
in 1970, approximately five million couples cohabited in 2000.103 
In 2010, the United States Department of Health and Human 
Services released a report that further documents this upward trend.104 
According to the report, half of all women and nearly half of all men 
reported cohabiting at some point in their lives,105 and 9 percent of 
adults were cohabiting in 2002.106 Moreover, the report documented 
what scholars have recognized for years: Cohabiting relationships are 
generally of short duration.107 After a few years, the cohabiting 
 
 99. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 121. 
 100. Marsha Garrison, Nonmarital Cohabitation: Social Revolution and Legal Regulation, 42 
FAM. L.Q. 309, 314 (2008). 
 101. Cynthia Grant Bowman, Social Science and Legal Policy: The Case of Heterosexual 
Cohabitation, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 2 (2007). 
 102. Before the 1970s, cohabitants were considered “statistically and socially invisible.” Id. 
at 4. 
 103. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 125. These numbers vary somewhat 
according to the source, but the dramatic increase is well documented. Compare Garrison, supra 
note 100, at 313 (“Between 1970 and 2000, the number of U.S. unmarried-cohabitant 
households rose almost ten-fold, from 523,000 to 4,880,000.”), with Bowman, supra note 101, at 
7 (noting the change “from fewer than 500,000 opposite-sex cohabiting couple households in 
1960 to 4.9 million (almost ten million individuals)”). 
 104. See generally PAULA Y. GOODWIN, WILLIAM D. MOSHER & ANJANI CHANDRA, 
NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MARRIAGE 
AND COHABITATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT BASED ON CYCLE 6 
(2002) OF THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH (2010), available at http://www.cdc
.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_028.pdf (providing data on cohabitation and marriage in the 
United States based on a representative sample of 12,571 men and women aged fifteen to forty-
four in 2002). The report defined cohabitation as “a man and woman living together in a sexual 
relationship without being married.” Id. at 1. 
 105. Id. at 27–28 tbls.11 & 12. 
 106. Id. at 1. 
 107. See, e.g., Pamela J. Smock, Cohabitation in the United States: An Appraisal of Research 
Themes, Findings, and Implications, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 1, 3 (2000) (“[A]bout 55% of cohabiting 
couples marry and 40% end the relationship within five years of the beginning of the 
cohabitation. Only about one sixth of cohabitations last at least three years and only a tenth last 
five years or more.” (citations omitted)). 
MAY IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/19/2012  9:38 AM 
2012] THE COHABITATION QUESTION 419 
relationship usually terminates in one of two ways: either the couple 
terminates their relationship or they marry, so they are no longer 
classified as cohabitants. Only 31 percent of women and 24 percent of 
men remained in their first cohabiting relationship for three or more 
years.108 Only 16 percent of women and 13 percent of men remained 
in cohabiting relationships after five years.109 
Although remarkably comprehensive in many aspects, the report 
fails to account for the increasing rate of cohabitation among senior 
citizens, who are most likely to have been awarded long-term or 
permanent alimony.110 Fortunately, another survey tracked 
cohabitation among “older adults,” which it defined as people over 
the age of fifty.111 In 2000, 1,088,428 older adults, who equaled 4 
percent of the unmarried older adult population, were cohabiting.112 
And nearly 9 percent of unmarried adults between the ages of fifty-
one and fifty-nine were cohabiting.113 Moreover, as baby boomers 
continue to enter this group, these percentages are expected to 
increase.114 
There are several reasons why some older adults cohabit, even if 
they did not do so earlier in their lifetimes. First, older cohabitants 
may refrain from remarriage because their previous marriage ended 
badly. Of all Americans over the age of fifty cohabiting in 2000, 71 
percent were either separated from their spouses or divorced.115 
Second, older adults’ financial situations are often complicated.116 
They may want to preserve their assets for children from a prior 
 
 108. GOODWIN ET AL., supra note 104, at 34–35 tbls.18 & 19. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Alimony awards have shifted from being permanent support to being short-term 
awards; permanent alimony is generally only available to women whose marriages endured for 
many years. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 203–04. 
 111. See generally Susan L. Brown, Gary R. Lee & Jennifer Roebuck Bulanda, Cohabitation 
Among Older Adults: A National Portrait, 61B J. GERONTOLOGY: SOC. SCI. S71 (2006) (using 
data from the 2000 Census and the 1998 Health and Retirement Study to analyze cohabitation 
among older adults). 
 112. Id. at S74–S75. Data from the Health and Retirement Study revealed slightly higher 
percentages. Id. at S75. 
 113. Id. at S75. 
 114. Id. at S78. 
 115. Id. at S75 tbl.1. 
 116. Steven K. Berenson, Should Cohabitation Matter in Family Law?, 13 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 
289, 313 (2011). 
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relationship instead of sharing those assets with a cohabitant.117 
Further, older adults may lose sources of income—such as certain 
social-security and pension benefits—if they marry.118 
A major question is the extent to which cohabitants of all ages 
become economically interdependent. Research indicates that 
cohabitants financially support each other less than do married 
couples.119 The extent to which cohabitants do become economically 
interdependent, however, is debated.120 This question demands 
further research and has major significance for this Note’s discussion 
of economic need in Part IV. 
Finally, just as the frequency of cohabitation has increased 
dramatically since 1970, social acceptance of cohabitation has also 
increased. In the mid-1900s, cohabitation outside of marriage was 
widely viewed as shameful.121 By the mid-1970s, however, attitudes 
were changing—at least among young people.122 In 1981, 40 percent of 
survey respondents approved “of men and women living together 
without being married if they want to.”123 Forty-five percent 
disapproved.124 In response to a similar question in 2007, 55 percent of 
respondents approved whereas only 27 percent disapproved.125  
 
 117. Id. The cohabitants may also fear the emotional impact that a remarriage might have 
on those children. Id. 
 118. Brown et al., supra note 111, at S72. Remarriage also generally terminates alimony. See 
supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text. 
 119. Garrison, supra note 100, at 323. 
 120. Compare id. (“[Cohabitants] are much more likely [than married couples] to split 
expenses instead of pooling their resources.” (emphasis added)), with Bowman, supra note 101, 
at 23 (“It is true that cohabitants are somewhat less likely than married couples to pool their 
income. However, a majority of both cohabitants and married couples do maintain joint 
finances. . . . 55% [of cohabitants] do join their incomes.” (citation omitted)). 
 121. Garrison, supra note 100, at 311. 
 122. See Arland Thornton & Linda Young-DeMarco, Four Decades of Trends in Attitudes 
Toward Family Issues in the United States: The 1960s Through the 1990s, 63 J. MARRIAGE & 
FAM. 1009, 1023 (2001) (“[I]n the mid-1970s more than half of all high school seniors reported 
that a man and woman living together without being married were ‘doing their own thing and 
not affecting anyone else,’ and almost another fifth said that cohabiting couples were 
‘experimenting with a worthwhile alternative lifestyle.’” (citation omitted)). 
 123. PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE AND RISE OF NEW FAMILIES 66 
(2010), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/11/pew-social-trends-2010-families
.pdf. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
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B. Outdated Cohabitation Laws and the Lack of Legal Protections 
Historically, the law either ignored or criminalized 
cohabitation.126 In 1962, the year when the Model Penal Code127 was 
first published, a majority of states criminalized nonmarital 
cohabitation.128 The Model Penal Code itself, however, did not 
criminalize cohabitation,129 and in the 1970s and 1980s many state 
bans were repealed or narrowed to target only public sexual 
behavior.130 Yet a handful of statutes remain on the books.131 
Any bans that remain today—as well as any related laws that 
penalize private sexual behavior between consenting adults—are 
effectively void after the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Lawrence 
v. Texas.132 In Lawrence, the Court declared a Texas statute 
criminalizing sexual activity between same-sex adults to be 
unconstitutional.133 The statute at issue violated the petitioners’ right 
to liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.134 This same right to liberty applies to heterosexual 
cohabitants. Subsequent to Lawrence, the Seventh Circuit noted that 
“[i]t is impossible to see how an unmarried heterosexual couple in a 
long-term relationship could receive less protection [than a 
homosexual couple].”135 When confronted with this issue, state courts 
generally agree.136 
The extent to which the law otherwise protects unmarried 
cohabitants, however, is limited. There is no comprehensive law of 
cohabitation in the United States.137 In every American jurisdiction, 
 
 126. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 121. 
 127. MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
 128. Margaret M. Mahoney, Forces Shaping the Law of Cohabitation for Opposite Sex 
Couples, 7 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 135, 141 (2005). 
 129. Id. 
 130. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 122. 
 131. Mahoney, supra note 128, at 147. 
 132. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 133. Id. at 578–79. 
 134. Id. at 578. 
 135. Christensen v. Cnty. of Boone, Ill., 483 F.3d 454, 463 (7th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). 
 136. See, e.g., Hobbs v. Smith, No. 05 CVS 267, 2006 WL 3103008, at *1 (N.C. Super. Ct. 
Aug. 25, 2006) (holding that North Carolina’s statute criminalizing cohabitation “violates 
plaintiff’s substantive due process right to liberty as explained in Lawrence v. Texas”). Case law 
on this issue is sparse, however, because enforcement of criminal cohabitation statutes is rare. 
GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 122. 
 137. Anna Stepieñ-Sporek & Margaret Ryznar, The Legal Treatment of Cohabitation in 
Poland and the United States, 79 UMKC L. REV. 373, 378 (2010). 
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unmarried cohabitants have fewer legal rights and duties than do 
married partners.138 Moreover, the law generally does not recognize 
cohabitation as a legally significant status.139 
The Court’s holding in Lawrence and the persistent lack of 
legally recognized protections for cohabitants have important 
implications for the cohabitation question. First, Lawrence suggests 
that termination of alimony based on a recipient’s post-divorce sexual 
conduct is an unconstitutional punishment. Second, courts’ reluctance 
to recognize a legal duty between cohabitants highlights the financial 
uncertainty for an alimony recipient in a system where she risks losing 
financial support from both her ex-spouse as well as from her current 
cohabitant. This Note accounts for those constitutional and policy-
based concerns in proposing a solution to the cohabitation question in 
the following Parts. 
III.  VARIATIONS, AMBIGUITIES, AND INCONSISTENCIES ACROSS 
JURISDICTIONS 
Rising rates of cohabitation and changing social mores have 
increasingly led state courts and legislatures to consider the 
cohabitation question.140 This Part details the current variation in case 
law and statutes across jurisdictions. First, it highlights some factors 
that affect how courts and legislatures answer the cohabitation 
question. Second, it explains the majority rule in states without 
specific statutory guidance. It then analyzes statutes that explicitly 
address the cohabitation question. Finally, it explores litigation across 
jurisdictions pertaining to what constitutes cohabitation and 
diminished need. 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. Mahoney, supra note 128, at 158. 
 140. Historically, courts took one of two approaches. Some decided that an alimony 
recipient’s post-divorce cohabitation had no effect on alimony payments because the law did not 
recognize cohabitation as a legally significant status. See, e.g., Bowman v. Bowman, 79 N.W.2d 
554, 561, 563 (Neb. 1956) (reversing the trial court’s alimony modification on the ground of 
cohabitation because the relationship between the ex-wife and her new partner was 
“meretricious rather than marital”). Other courts, by contrast, terminated an ex-wife’s alimony 
as punishment for her “illicit” behavior. See, e.g., Weber v. Weber, 140 N.W. 1052, 1055 (Wis. 
1913) (“[I]f the wife, without the fault of the husband, and without any adequate excuse or 
palliation, deliberately chooses a life of shame and dishonor, has no other equitable claim upon 
property in the hands of the husband, and he is compelled by his daily toil to earn the money 
paid to her, the court may make the misconduct of the wife the ground for cutting off all 
alimony, or for reducing the same as may, in its discretion, seem just and equitable under all the 
circumstances of the case.”). 
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A. Factors Affecting How Courts and Legislatures Respond 
Decisions to modify or terminate alimony based upon 
cohabitation are often grounded in fairness concerns. Some courts 
specifically state two issues that arise when an alimony recipient 
cohabits: (1) that an alimony recipient might unfairly receive financial 
support from both her ex-spouse and her cohabitant, and (2) that an 
alimony recipient might use her alimony payments to support her 
cohabitant.141 
Because alimony recipients generally lose their alimony when 
they remarry, courts fear that failing to terminate or modify alimony 
upon cohabitation by an alimony recipient may discourage 
remarriage.142 Thus, some courts and legislatures may equate 
remarriage and cohabitation in the alimony context in an attempt to 
encourage remarriage. 
Finally, whether explicitly noted or simply implied, moral 
assessments may influence judicial and legislative responses. The 
language in opinions and statutes sometimes reflects a negative moral 
assessment of cohabitation.143 One ex-wife expressed frustrations that 
likely extend to other alimony recipients in her situation: “I don’t 
know why . . . I’m getting tarred and battered because I have a 
boyfriend.”144 Although her ex-husband had lived with his second wife 
before they married without any negative repercussions,145 the court 
terminated the ex-wife’s alimony because she cohabited and failed to 
overcome a presumption of mutual support.146 Moral assessments, 
 
 141. E.g., Austin v. Austin, 866 N.E.2d 74, 77 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007). 
 142. AM. LAW INST., supra note 51, § 5.09 cmt. a; see also Gayet v. Gayet, 456 A.2d 102, 105 
(N.J. 1983) (“We respect the concerns of commentators that this approach to cohabitation may 
discourage marriage, at a time when human relationships have grown more and more 
transient.”). 
 143. Georgia, for example, injects explicit moral distaste for cohabitation into its statute 
when it describes the relationship as “meretricious.” See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-19(b) (2010) 
(defining cohabitation as “dwelling together continuously and openly in a meretricious 
relationship with another person, regardless of the sex of the other person” (emphasis added)). 
For an example of a court decision that offers a negative moral assessment of cohabitation, see 
Love v. Love, 626 S.E.2d 56 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006). In Love, the court found that “[b]ecause the 
State has ‘a compelling interest in promoting marriage and discouraging meretricious 
relationships,’ a rule allowing alimony to continue when the supported spouse cohabits without 
marrying is ‘illogical and offensive to public policy.’” Id. at 59. (quoting Croom v. Croom, 406 
S.E.2d 381, 382 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam)). 
 144. Rester v. Rester, 5 So.3d 1132, 1134 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Beth Rester) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 1137. 
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along with other factors, affect judicial and legislative responses. The 
next Sections address how courts and legislatures respond to the 
cohabitation question. 
B. Judicial Responses: The Development of the Majority Rule 
Many states have not enacted explicit legislation pertaining to 
the cohabitation question. In the absence of explicit legislation, courts 
look to the general alimony statutes in their respective states.147 Two 
statutory provisions often inform these courts’ decisions. First, most 
alimony statutes provide for the modification of alimony upon a 
showing of substantially changed circumstances.148 Second, many 
statutes explicitly authorize the termination of alimony upon 
remarriage.149 
A minority of states without statutes addressing the cohabitation 
question automatically terminate alimony when the recipient 
cohabits.150 These jurisdictions thus treat cohabitation and remarriage 
identically in the alimony context. The majority of jurisdictions 
without specific statutes, however, have rejected the rule that alimony 
payments are automatically terminated upon a finding of 
cohabitation. These states only modify or terminate alimony upon 
proof that the cohabitation has resulted in diminished need.151 In 
Garlinger v. Garlinger,152 a New Jersey court articulated a need-based 
test that became the majority rule.153 The Garlinger court rejected an 
automatic-termination rule but held that cohabitation constituted a 
relevant factor in determining whether to modify alimony 
 
 147. A majority of states authorize modification of alimony by statute in certain 
circumstances. GREGORY ET AL., supra note 11, at 322–23. 
 148. Id.; see also, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-327(A) (2007) (“[T]he provisions of any 
decree respecting maintenance or support may be modified or terminated only on a showing of 
changed circumstances that are substantial and continuing . . . .”). 
 149. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 150. AM. LAW INST., supra note 51, § 5.09 cmt. a; see also, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-2-55 
(LexisNexis 2011) (terminating alimony upon proof that the spouse receiving alimony “is living 
openly or cohabiting with a member of the opposite sex”). 
 151. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 892 A.2d 175, 182 (Vt. 2005) (“The majority rule in 
jurisdictions without a specific statute is that cohabitation by the recipient spouse can result in 
reduction or elimination of a maintenance award only if it improves the financial circumstances 
of the recipient spouse enough to substantially reduce the need for maintenance.”). 
 152. Garlinger v. Garlinger, 347 A.2d 799 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975). 
 153. See Gayet v. Gayet, 456 A.2d 102, 104 (N.J. 1983) (“[T]he majority of jurisdictions have 
adopted an economic needs test . . . clearly defined in Garlinger . . . [and] used by other courts.” 
(quoting Lillian Hamor, Note, The Effect of Third Party Cohabitation on Alimony Payments, 15 
TULSA L.J. 772, 779 (1980))). 
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payments.154 Under Garlinger, if the alimony recipient is financially 
supported by her cohabitant or uses her alimony payments to support 
her cohabitant, a court may modify or terminate alimony.155 This 
approach recognizes that courts should not decrease alimony when 
the cohabitation does not affect the alimony recipient’s financial 
need. 
At its core, the need-based test seeks to balance conflicting 
interests. Courts recognize the concern that alimony recipients could 
choose cohabitation instead of marriage in order to continue 
receiving alimony.156 At the same time, however, states are also 
concerned with “individual privacy, autonomy, and the right to 
develop personal relationships free from governmental sanctions.”157 
Moreover, an alimony recipient would be unprotected if her alimony 
were terminated and her cohabitation subsequently ended.158 By 
focusing on financial need, majority-rule jurisdictions seek to reject 
the “model of domestic relations that provided women with security 
in exchange for economic dependence and discrimination.”159 
Majority-rule jurisdictions, however, struggle with defining financial 
need as well as defining cohabitation.160 
Some courts may decide that some questions are better left to 
the legislative branch and refrain from making policy determinations 
related to the need-based test, such as whether to presume that the 
cohabitation diminished the alimony recipient’s need. At least one 
court has explicitly called for legislative action: 
[A]ny changes in such declared policy must originate in the 
legislature. A number of states—most notably California, Illinois, 
and New York—have enacted statutes that specifically deal with this 
 
 154. Garlinger, 347 A.2d at 803. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 157. Gayet, 456 A.2d at 103. 
 158. See Gilman v. Gilman, 956 P.2d 761, 765 (Nev. 1998) (“[T]he test . . . recognizes the fact 
that a recipient spouse may be left largely unprotected, from an economic standpoint, if he or 
she breaks off a relationship with a cohabitant.”). This concern is particularly worrisome 
because states created alimony in part to prevent ex-spouses from becoming wards of the state. 
Id. 
 159. Gayet, 456 A.2d at 104 (quoting Lepis v. Lepis, 416 A.2d 45, 54 (N.J. 1980)) (internal 
quotation mark omitted). 
 160. See infra Part III.D–E. 
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problem. If changes in Arizona law are desirable, they should be left 
to legislative action and not to the courts.161 
C. Varied Legislative Responses 
Unlike the jurisdictions without specific statutes, some 
legislatures explicitly address the cohabitation question. These 
statutes vary widely. And although legislative guidance should direct 
courts in this area, these statutes are in reality often no more clear 
than the rules laid down by the common-law decisions they replace. 
1. Disagreement over the role of financial need. A number of 
statutes follow the automatic-termination rule and thus direct courts 
to terminate alimony upon cohabitation without regard to a change in 
financial need.162 Some of these statutes expressly analogize 
cohabitation to marriage and include both relationships in the same 
clause.163 
California does not terminate alimony automatically, but it 
assumes that the cohabitation has decreased the alimony recipient’s 
financial need: “Except as otherwise agreed to by the parties in 
writing, there is a rebuttable presumption, affecting the burden of 
proof, of decreased need for spousal support if the supported party is 
cohabiting with a person of the opposite sex.”164 If the court 
 
 161. Smith v. Mangum, 747 P.2d 609, 612 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (citation omitted). 
 162. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-2-55 (LexisNexis 2011) (terminating alimony upon proof that 
the spouse receiving alimony is cohabiting); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/510(c) (West 2009 & 
Supp. 2012) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-16.9(b) (West 2000) (same); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 20-3-150 (1985 & Supp. 2011) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(10) (LexisNexis 2007 
& Supp. 2012) (same); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109(A) (2008) (terminating alimony upon proof 
that the spouse has cohabited for a year or more). 
 163. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109(A) (2008) (terminating alimony, subject to two 
limited exceptions, when “the spouse receiving support has been habitually cohabiting with 
another person in a relationship analogous to marriage for one year or more”); see also ALA. 
CODE § 30-2-55 (LexisNexis 2011) (terminating alimony upon “proof that the spouse receiving 
such alimony has remarried or that such spouse is living openly or cohabiting with a member of 
the opposite sex”). 
 164. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4323(a)(1) (West 2004). This Note sometimes discusses California’s 
approach to various facets of the cohabitation question—even though California departs from 
the approaches taken by other states—for two principal reasons. First, California was the first 
state to enact a no-fault divorce statute, and other states followed. See supra notes 47–48 and 
accompanying text. Second, California has taken “dramatic step[s]” in addressing certain 
marriage-law and cohabitation issues before other states have taken such steps. See GROSSMAN 
& FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 10 (“The next dramatic step began, as usual, in California, in the 
famous case of Marvin v. Marvin[, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976) (en banc)].”). In essence, the 
California Supreme Court recognized that contracts between cohabitants to share any money 
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determines that circumstances have changed, it may modify or 
terminate alimony.165 This statute thus gives courts some leeway when 
the recipient establishes that the circumstances do not result in 
diminished need. 
Other statutes direct courts to intervene only if the cohabitation 
has actually resulted in diminished financial need—endorsing the 
majority rule in these jurisdictions without statutes.166 Connecticut, for 
example, authorizes its courts to modify or terminate alimony 
“because the living arrangements cause such a change of 
circumstances so as to alter the financial needs of that party.”167 
Likewise, Oklahoma courts may modify or terminate alimony upon 
changed circumstances “relating to [the] need for support or ability to 
support.”168 These statutes, however, do not indicate what constitutes 
diminished need. Further, many statutes do not elucidate whether the 
alimony payments should only be modified by the amount of a 
demonstrated change in need or whether cohabitation should itself 
serve as a signal that the recipient no longer needs support. 
2. Conflicting definitions of cohabitation. The other major issue 
faced by courts interpreting cohabitation statutes is defining 
cohabitation with precision. Statutes that use the term “cohabitation” 
vary widely in whether they define it and, if they do, how they define 
it. Other statutes do not use the term at all, referring to it by another 
name. 
States that define cohabitation in their statutes differ in how 
specifically they define the term. North Carolina, an automatic-
 
and property could be legally enforced, Marvin, 557 P.2d at 110, which “caused a stir in legal 
circles, was widely reported in the papers, and was a topic of nervous humor on talk shows and 
in magazines.” GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 10. 
 165. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4323(a)(1) (West 2004). 
 166. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-86(b) (West 2009 & Supp. 2012) (authorizing 
superior courts to modify, suspend, or terminate alimony upon a showing that the recipient “is 
living with another person under circumstances which the court finds should result in the 
modification, suspension, reduction or termination of alimony because the living arrangements 
cause such a change of circumstances as to alter the financial needs of that party”); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 61.14(1)(b)(1) (West 2012) (authorizing the court to reduce or terminate alimony upon 
proof that “a supportive relationship has existed between the obligee and a person with whom 
the obligee resides”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 134(C) (West 2001 & Supp. 2012) (granting 
the court the power to reduce or terminate alimony payments if cohabitation is alleged and 
there is “proof of substantial change of circumstances of either party to the divorce relating to 
need for support or ability to support”). 
 167. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-86(b) (West 2009 & Supp. 2012). 
 168. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 134(C) (West 2001 & Supp. 2012). 
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termination state, defines cohabitation as “the act of two adults 
dwelling together continuously and habitually in a private 
heterosexual relationship even if this relationship is not solemnized 
by marriage, or a private homosexual relationship.”169 In North 
Carolina, evidence of cohabitation includes “the voluntary mutual 
assumption of those marital rights, duties, and obligations which are 
usually manifested by married people, and which include, but are not 
necessarily dependent on, sexual relations.”170 
Other statutory definitions provide less guidance for the courts 
but still highlight certain factors. Several statutes emphasize that the 
cohabitation must be continuous.171 South Carolina’s statute provides 
the most straightforward definition of continuity: “continued 
cohabitation” signifies “a period of ninety or more consecutive 
days.”172 Some states also require that cohabitation involves a 
conjugal relationship.173 South Carolina does not state that the 
relationship must resemble marriage, but it does note that it must be 
“romantic.”174 Instead of defining cohabitation, California only states 
what the term does not require. In California, the couple need not 
hold themselves out as husband and wife.175 
Finally, some state legislatures that did not address the 
cohabitation question in the past have recently clarified their 
definitions of cohabitation. In 2011, the governor of Massachusetts 
signed an alimony-reform act that took effect in 2012.176 The statute 
provides that “[g]eneral term alimony shall be suspended, reduced or 
 
 169. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-16.9(b) (West 2000). 
 170. Id. North Carolina’s discussion of what constitutes evidence of cohabitation closely 
resembles the definition of cohabitation from the sixth edition of Black’s Law Dictionary. See 
infra note 189 and accompanying text. 
 171. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/510(c) (West 2009 & Supp. 2012) (terminating 
alimony when the recipient “cohabits with another person on a resident, continuing conjugal 
basis”). 
 172. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-150 (1985 & Supp. 2001). Further, South Carolina’s statute 
prevents couples from evading the ninety-day requirement. See id. (“The court may determine 
that a continued cohabitation exists if there is evidence that the supported spouse resides with 
another person in a romantic relationship for periods of less than ninety days and the two 
periodically separate in order to circumvent the ninety-day requirement.”). 
 173. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 134(C) (West 2001 & Supp. 2012) (“[C]ohabitation 
means the dwelling together continuously and habitually of a man and a woman who are in a 
private conjugal relationship not solemnized as a marriage . . . .”); supra note 171. 
 174. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-150 (1985 & Supp. 2011). 
 175. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4323(a)(2) (West 2004). 
 176. Act effective Mar. 1, 2012, ch. 124, 2011 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. (LexisNexis) (codified 
at MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 208, § 49 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012)). 
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terminated upon the cohabitation of the recipient spouse when the 
payor shows that the recipient spouse has maintained a common 
household . . . with another person for a continuous period of at least 
3 months.”177 A “common household” means that a couple “share[s] a 
primary residence together with or without others.”178 The statute also 
provides that courts may reinstate alimony that was suspended, 
reduced, or terminated on the ground of cohabitation if the 
cohabitation ends before the termination date in the original court 
order.179 
Statutes that do not use the term cohabitation vary in what terms 
they use instead. Connecticut, for example, employs the phrase 
“living with another person.”180 And New York, the first state to enact 
a statute explicitly addressing the cohabitation question,181 directs its 
courts to ask whether “the wife is habitually living with another man 
and holding herself out as his wife, although not married to such a 
man.”182 Florida’s cohabitation statute, enacted in 2005,183 likewise 
does not use the term cohabitation.184 It provides an extensive, but not 
exhaustive, list of relevant factors in assessing whether a “supportive 
relationship” sufficient to modify or terminate alimony exists.185 One 
factor is the extent to which the recipient and her partner “have held 
 
 177. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 208, § 49(d) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-86 (West 2009 & Supp. 2012). 
 181. Prior to the 1970s, only New York had enacted a statute addressing cohabitation by an 
alimony recipient. J. Thomas Oldham, Cohabitation by an Alimony Recipient Revisited, 20 J. 
FAM. L. 615, 620–21 (1982). New York enacted its statute in 1938. Act of Mar. 26, 1938, ch. 
161, § 1159, 1938 N.Y. Laws 682, 682–83 (current version at N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW (McKinney 
2010)). 
 182. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 248 (McKinney 2010). Some statutes explicitly note that 
alimony is only affected if the recipient is cohabiting with someone of the opposite sex. See, e.g., 
ALA. CODE § 30-2-55 (LexisNexis 2011) (terminating alimony upon proof that the spouse 
receiving alimony “is living openly or cohabiting with a member of the opposite sex”); CAL. 
FAM. CODE § 4323 (West 2004) (creating a rebuttable presumption of decreased need for 
alimony if the recipient is “cohabiting with a person of the opposite sex”). But see GA. CODE 
ANN. § 19-6-19 (2010) (“‘[C]ohabitation’ means dwelling together . . . with another person, 
regardless of the sex of the other person.” (emphasis added)). 
 183. Act effective June 10, 2005, ch. 2005-168, § 1(b), 2005 Fla. Laws 1726, 1727 (codified as 
amended at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.14(1)(b) (West 2012)). The 2005 enactment essentially 
codified the existing case law in Florida on the cohabitation question. Gladstone & Gladstone, 
supra note 14, at 45. 
 184. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.14(1)(b) (West 2012). 
 185. Id. § 61.14(1)(b)(2). 
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themselves out as a married couple.”186 Other relevant factors include 
the length of time that the couple has resided together “in a 
permanent place of abode,” their “financial interdependence,” the 
extent to which they have “supported” each other, any “property 
sharing or support” agreement, whether they have “worked together 
to create or enhance anything of value,” whether they have purchased 
property together, and whether they have supported each other’s 
children.187 
D. Problems Defining Cohabitation in Litigation 
States with specific statutes on the cohabitation question and 
states with common-law rules face similar problems in litigation. 
Litigation that touches upon the cohabitation question often turns on 
whether the recipient indeed “cohabited.” Generally, parties disagree 
about two issues: first, what constitutes living together, and second, 
what facts in addition to common residency are required for courts to 
make a finding of cohabitation. 
As a threshold matter, courts do not agree on whether the term 
cohabitation has a plain meaning.188 Courts referring to the term’s 
ordinary meaning have relied on the definition of cohabitation in the 
sixth edition of Black’s Law Dictionary: “to live together as husband 
and wife. The mutual assumption of those marital rights, duties and 
obligations which are usually manifested by married people, including 
but not necessarily dependent on sexual relations.”189 Webster’s Third 
New International Dictionary offers a similar definition: “to live 
together as husband and wife usually without a legal marriage having 
 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Some jurisdictions hold that the term cohabitation—without an explicit provision in the 
separation agreement or a stipulation by the parties—is ambiguous and lacks a plain meaning. 
See, e.g., Graev v. Graev, 898 N.E.2d 909, 914 (N.Y. 2008) (“[T]he word ‘cohabitation’ is 
ambiguous . . . neither the dictionary nor New York case law supplies an authoritative or ‘plain’ 
meaning. Similarly, courts in other states have not ascribed a uniform meaning to the word 
‘cohabitation’ as used in separation agreements.” (citation omitted)). Other courts, by contrast, 
have held that cohabitation does have an ordinary, plain meaning. See, e.g., Adamson v. 
Adamson, 958 S.W.2d 598, 600–01 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (relying on the term’s plain meaning and 
holding “that when a man and woman spend as much time together as their respective jobs 
allow, regularly engage in sexual relations . . . , purchase a home together,” and engage in other 
similar activities, “such people are ‘cohabiting’ as that word is understood by reasonable 
people”). 
 189. See, e.g., Baker v. Baker, 566 N.W.2d 806, 811 (N.D. 1997) (citing BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 260 (6th ed. 1990)). 
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been performed.”190 Courts less frequently cite other definitions of the 
term that do not include an analogy to marriage; they “defin[e] 
cohabitation as merely living together in a sexual or intimate 
relationship.”191 
1. Residency. Regardless of whether courts determine that the 
term cohabitation has a plain meaning, courts often struggle to 
determine to what extent the couple must live together and for how 
long. Some courts do not require that couples reside together 
continuously, which leads to the problem that some casual dating 
relationships may be construed as cohabitation. When couples stay 
together at most five times a week, some courts find that the couple 
cohabited.192 Similarly, in In re Marriage of Susan,193 an appellate court 
affirmed that a couple that maintained separate residences and that 
did not share expenses had cohabited.194 The Susan court emphasized 
that the couple dated for several years, often spent the night together, 
vacationed together, and spent holidays together.195 
South Carolina’s ninety-day requirement,196 by contrast, provides 
clear guidance to courts so that judges are not forced to weigh the 
exact number of overnight stays that tips the scale in favor of a 
finding of cohabitation. Thus, applying its statute in a recent case, a 
South Carolina court found that a couple did not cohabit because 
“they did not spend ninety consecutive nights together.”197 
 
 190. Id. (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 440 (1971)). 
 191. Smith v. Smith, 769 N.W.2d 591, 593 (Mich. 2008) (Corrigan, J., dissenting) (citing four 
dictionaries that offer such a definition). 
 192. See, e.g., Rehm v. Rehm, 409 S.E.2d 723, 724 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991) (affirming the trial 
court’s conclusion that the couple cohabited based on the trial court’s finding that the couple 
stayed over as many as five nights per week, that the couple kissed goodbye at the door, that the 
couple took overnight vacations of more than one night, and that the parties had an exclusive, 
monogamous relationship). In some circumstances, however, courts may find cohabitation even 
when an unmarried couple does not live together continuously but otherwise acts as a 
cohabiting couple. See, e.g., Adamson v. Adamson, 958 S.W.2d 598, 601 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) 
(finding cohabitation as a matter of law when a couple “spend[s] as much time together as their 
respective jobs allow, regularly engage in sexual relations when they are together, purchase a 
home together (taking title as joint tenants), and sign a deed of trust declaring their intention to 
‘occupy, establish and use the [p]roperty as [their] principal residence’” (second and third 
alterations in original) (quoting the deed)). 
 193. In re Marriage of Susan, 856 N.E.2d 1167 (Ill. Ct. App. 2006). 
 194. Id. at 1170–71. 
 195. Id. 
 196. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
 197. Biggins v. Burdette, 708 S.E.2d 237, 239 (S.C. Ct. App. 2011). 
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2. Additional elements. Aside from determining the frequency of 
overnight stays that constitutes living together, courts also wrestle 
with what additional elements are required to constitute cohabitation. 
Not requiring additional elements leads to absurd results. In the 
Florida case Craissati v. Craissati,198 described in the Introduction, an 
appellate court held that Patricia had cohabited with her cellmate in 
prison and thus terminated her alimony.199 In that case the court 
required nothing more than the ex-wife sharing a prison cell.200 As a 
general rule, courts have recognized that more than living together is 
required; otherwise, mere roommates would constitute cohabitants, 
and alimony recipients would be forced to live in isolation to receive 
alimony.201 
Courts disagree on the importance of sexual relations in 
determining whether a couple cohabited. Some require sexual 
conduct.202 Others do not.203 Requiring sexual conduct prevents courts 
from classifying a mere roommate relationship as cohabitation. 
Making it a required element, however, would mean that if a couple 
indeed has a relationship akin to that of married partners, but does 
not have sex—if, for example, the male cohabitant is impotent—then 
the court would not find that they are cohabitants.204 
Nor is it clear that requiring a sexual relationship in any 
definition of cohabitation brings courts closer to a coherent approach. 
There are certainly circumstances in which two people live together 
and have sex, but where few would consider the relationship to 
constitute cohabitation. A 2011 case illustrates this point. In Myers v. 
 
 198. Craissati v. Craissati, 997 So. 2d 458 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). 
 199. Id. at 460. 
 200. Id. (Klein, J., dissenting). 
 201. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Molloy, 635 P.2d 928, 930 (Colo. App. 1981) (holding that 
the ex-wife was not cohabiting because “there was no evidence of a sexual relationship, a 
romantic involvement, or even a homemaker-companion relationship” between the ex-wife and 
her cotenant); Austin v. Austin, 866 N.E.2d 74, 79 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (holding that 
cohabitation did not occur because the recipient’s “living arrangement [wa]s nothing more than 
a business relationship”). 
 202. See, e.g., Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, 674 (Utah 1985) (“‘[C]ohabitation’ means 
to dwell together in a common residence and to participate in sexual contact that evidences a 
larger conjugal relationship.”). 
 203. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Sappington, 478 N.E.2d 376, 381 (Ill. 1985) (“We believe 
that when two people live together . . . it is the husband-and-wife-like relationship which bears 
the rational relationship to the need for support, not the absence or presence of sexual 
intercourse.”). 
 204. Cf. id. (holding that it is possible for an impotent male to cohabit and clarifying that 
under Illinois law a conjugal relationship does not require sexual conduct). 
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Myers,205 the alimony recipient moved into her parents’ home, at least 
part time, and commenced an allegedly sexual relationship with her 
parents’ teenage foster son.206 The trial court held that the two 
requirements for cohabitation were met under Utah law: (1) the 
couple shared a common residence, and (2) the alimony recipient 
failed to carry her burden proving the lack of sexual conduct.207 The 
Court of Appeals subsequently reversed, holding that the two lacked 
a relationship akin to marriage, even if they occupied the same 
household and engaged in sexual conduct.208 The Supreme Court of 
Utah affirmed, explaining that 
[t]he ultimate question in this case was whether Ms. Meyers and [the 
foster child] were cohabiting, and Mr. Myers bore the burden on 
that issue. The existence of an intimate sexual relationship was 
relevant to the statutory inquiry, but Ms. Myers bore no specific 
burden of disproving it. Instead, it was Mr. Myers’s burden to 
establish cohabitation by a preponderance of the evidence, and both 
parties were entitled to present—and did present—evidence they 
deemed relevant to that inquiry.209 
Both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Utah 
recognized the unique circumstances in Myers. Even if the ex-wife 
had a sexual relationship with her parents’ teenage foster son, finding 
cohabitation in Myers would not have served the underlying purpose 
of Utah’s approach to the cohabitation question.210 Indeed, this case 
neither resembled a marriage-like arrangement nor a relationship 
that resulted in diminished financial need on the part of the alimony 
recipient. 
 
 205. Myers v. Myers, 266 P.3d 806 (Utah 2011). 
 206. Id. at 807. Ms. Myers denied that she had a sexual relationship with her parents’ 
teenage foster son, and there was no direct evidence to contradict her assertion. Her ex-
husband, however, used circumstantial evidence to suggest the existence of a sexual 
relationship. Id. at 807–08. 
 207. Id. at 808. 
 208. Myers v. Myers, 231 P.3d 815, 819 (Utah Ct. App. 2010), aff’d, 266 P.3d 806 (Utah 
2011). 
 209. Myers, 266 P.3d at 812. 
 210. Id. at 809, 813–14 (“Even if Ms. Myers and M.H. had a sexual relationship and lived 
together under the same roof, their relationship had almost none of the other hallmarks of a 
marriage. . . . Their relationship may eventually have led to sexual intimacy, but that alone is 
insufficient to establish cohabitation.”). 
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E. Problems Defining Diminished Need in Litigation 
In jurisdictions that do not automatically terminate alimony if 
the recipient cohabits, litigation centers not only on the definition of 
cohabitation but also on the definition of diminished financial need. 
In addition, issues arise regarding who bears the burden of proof. 
Courts applying the need-based test generally do not modify 
alimony when an alimony recipient’s cohabitant incidentally benefits 
from fixed expenses that the alimony recipient pays.211 For example, 
although a cohabitant may benefit from an alimony recipient’s 
expenditure on heating in a shared residence, the cost of heat would 
remain constant even if the alimony recipient lived alone, and thus 
this expenditure does not indicate that the court should modify 
alimony.212 Indeed, the fact that a cohabitant may benefit from an 
alimony recipient’s payment of fixed expenses does not indicate that 
the ex-spouse herself has experienced any decrease in financial 
need.213 
Whether sharing household expenses that are not fixed 
constitutes a change in circumstances sufficient to warrant a reduction 
in alimony payments, however, has engendered debate. Some states 
hold that if an alimony recipient purchased a cohabitant’s food, it 
would be possible to find that she did not need that portion of her 
alimony.214 Similarly, some courts consider whether an alimony 
recipient’s cohabitant performs house maintenance and repairs.215 The 
Vermont Supreme Court, however, has disagreed and has stated that 
“even if the new partner contributed equally to the expenses of the 
household, [the court] would not hold . . . that this alone is a 
 
 211. See, e.g., Gilman v. Gilman, 956 P.2d 761, 765 (Nev. 1998) (“Shared living 
arrangements, unaccompanied by evidence of a decrease in the actual financial needs of the 
recipient spouse, are generally insufficient to call for alimony modification.”). 
 212. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 418 A.2d 1140, 1143 (Me. 1980). 
 213. Id. 
 214. See, e.g., Perri v. Perri, 608 N.E.2d 790, 795 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (noting that the trial 
court could find on remand that the recipient “was not in need of that portion of the alimony, if 
any, that directly benefited [the cohabitant], such as the cost of the food for him which she 
paid”); Olson v. Olson, 552 N.W.2d 396, 401 (S.D. 1996) (“[A]lthough it would be permissible 
for the court to consider any tangible increases in Judy’s expenses arising from her companion’s 
residing with her, such as increases in grocery or phone bills, the value of intangibles which do 
not actually increase Judy’s living expenses, such as the fair rental value of her home, are 
irrelevant.”). 
 215. See, e.g., Van Dyke v. Steinle, 902 P.2d 1372, 1384 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that 
the house maintenance and repairs that an alimony recipient’s cohabitant performed could be 
considered on remand in determining whether the court should reduce the recipient’s alimony). 
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substantial improvement in the recipient spouse’s financial 
circumstances so as to warrant a modification of maintenance.”216 
According to the court, 
[t]his improvement cannot alone be changed circumstances unless 
[courts] are prepared to hold that a former spouse who takes a 
roommate to reduce expenses will lose the savings because of an 
offsetting reduction in maintenance. Maintenance recipients should 
normally retain the benefit of actions they take to live more 
economically.217 
States also differ on who has the burden of proving diminished 
need. Some require actual evidence that the recipient is benefiting 
financially whereas others presume that cohabitation itself reduces 
the recipient’s need.218 States in the first group place the burden of 
establishing diminished need on the party seeking the modification.219 
Other states, however, create a rebuttable presumption of diminished 
need and hold that upon a prima facie showing of cohabitation, the 
burden shifts to the alimony recipient to prove that her financial need 
has not changed.220 
 
 216. Miller v. Miller, 892 A.2d 175, 185 (Vt. 2005). 
 217. Id. at 183. 
 218. AM. LAW INST., supra note 51, § 5.09 cmt. a. 
 219. See, e.g., Van Dyke, 902 P.2d at 1382 (stating that the “burden does not shift to presume 
reduced [financial] need”); In re Marriage of Dwyer, 825 P.2d 1018, 1019 (Colo. App. 1991) 
(same); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 418 A.2d 1140, 1142–43 (Me. 1980) (same); Smith v. Smith, 849 
P.2d 1097, 1098–99 (Okla. Civ. App. 1992) (same). 
 220. See, e.g., Wallace v. Wallace, 12 So. 3d 572, 575 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (“[P]roof of 
cohabitation creates a presumption that a material change in circumstances has occurred. This 
presumption will shift the burden to the recipient spouse to come forward with evidence 
suggesting that there is no mutual support . . . .” (citation omitted) (quoting Scharwath v. 
Scharwath, 702 So. 2d 1210, 1211 (Miss. 1997) (en banc)) (internal quotation mark omitted)); 
Ozolins v. Ozolins, 705 A.2d 1230, 1232 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (holding, upon a 
showing of cohabitation, that “[t]he burden of proof, which is ordinarily on the party seeking 
modification, shifts to the dependent spouse”). California creates a rebuttable presumption by 
statute. See supra notes 164–165 and accompanying text. The ALI’s Principles of the Law of 
Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations, AM. LAW INST., supra note 51, likewise 
create a rebuttable presumption, see id. § 5.09(3) (“An obligation to make periodic 
payments . . . is suspended when the obligor shows that the obligee maintained a ‘common 
household’ . . . unless . . . the obligee shows that he or she and the other person do not share ‘a 
life together as a couple.’”). Although the ALI argues that treating cohabitation and marriage 
differently can lead to “[p]otentially troublesome results,” id. cmt. a, this rebuttable 
presumption is inconsistent with the ALI’s explanation of alimony as compensation for 
economic losses, see supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
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IV.  HIGHLIGHTING PROBLEMS AND PROPOSING SOLUTIONS 
Courts and legislatures addressing the cohabitation question face 
three major obstacles. This Part highlights those problems and 
proposes some solutions. First, there are multiple alimony theories,221 
and not all of the contemporary theories support modification of 
alimony upon cohabitation. Judges should only modify payments 
based on an alimony recipient’s cohabitation if the initial court 
awarded alimony based on need, as opposed to a different theory. 
Second, the meaning of both cohabitation and of diminished need is 
often unclear. Courts and legislatures should define these terms 
precisely to promote predictability and consistency across awards. 
Third, courts and legislatures should consider what happens when 
cohabitation ends. In situations when alimony modification is 
warranted based on a recipient’s diminished need, a judge should at 
most suspend, not terminate, alimony. 
A. Grounding Responses to the Cohabitation Question in Theory 
As discussed in Part I, courts do not follow a single theoretical 
model to justify alimony awards.222 They award alimony for different 
reasons in different situations. This practice is reasonable and perhaps 
even advantageous so long as judges consider the theoretical basis for 
alimony relied upon for the original award when subsequently 
deciding whether to modify alimony payments. Judges deciding the 
cohabitation question should thus read the order dissolving the 
marriage and awarding alimony and determine why a court awarded 
alimony in the first place.223 Only if the court awarded alimony based 
on need should cohabitation affect alimony payments. Thus, any rule 
that would automatically terminate alimony payments upon a finding 
of cohabitation, no matter the theoretical basis for the original 
alimony award, is not appropriate. 
Courts awarding alimony in the twenty-first century generally 
base awards on one of several rationales. They may emphasize the 
recipient’s need and the supporting spouse’s ability to pay, as courts 
 
 221. See supra Part I.B. 
 222. See supra Part I.B. 
 223. Ideally, the court that initially awarded alimony would state why it did so. Even without 
an explicit statement from the court, however, judges deciding the cohabitation question should 
be able to determine the initial court’s reason for awarding alimony based on the circumstances 
of the particular case. 
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have for centuries.224 Or they may refer to something else that loosely 
fits under a contract, partnership, or compensation theory.225 They 
may emphasize that the alimony recipient sacrificed career 
opportunities to support her spouse while in school, contributed to 
the marriage through her work within the home, or cared for the 
couple’s children and perhaps continues to do so post-divorce.226 
If judges award alimony on the basis of something other than 
need, cohabitation should not be considered when deciding whether 
to modify alimony. This practice does not make sense based on the 
reason that the court awarded alimony in the first place,227 and it 
unfairly punishes an ex-spouse for her post-divorce conduct. 
Moreover, Lawrence suggests that penalizing private sexual 
behavior—including an ex-spouse’s post-divorce sexual conduct—is 
unconstitutional.228 Any portion of an alimony award that is based on 
something other than need should not change based on 
cohabitation.229 
To the extent that alimony remains need-based and tied to 
spousal support, there may be a justification to modify alimony upon 
cohabitation in certain circumstances.230 One reason not to eliminate 
the cohabitation inquiry altogether is that cohabitation may signal the 
existence of a supportive relationship that decreases the alimony 
recipient’s financial need. Allowing this inquiry protects former 
spouses who pay alimony because they may not know whether 
alimony recipients’ needs have changed. Indeed, it is difficult to 
 
 224. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 225. See supra Part I.B.2–3. 
 226. See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text. 
 227. As discussed in the Introduction, supra, this argument stems from concerns about 
consistency and predictability as well as from concerns that courts and legislatures may be more 
likely to incorporate moral or other personal judgments in the absence of a theoretical basis for 
their decisions. See supra text accompanying note 94. 
 228. See supra notes 132–136 and accompanying text. 
 229. Sometimes judges award alimony for multiple reasons. In those cases, judges 
addressing the cohabitation question should determine what theories support each part of the 
alimony award. 
 230. Another justification is the fact that jurisdictions generally terminate alimony upon 
remarriage. As previously noted, whether alimony should terminate upon remarriage is beyond 
the scope of this Note. See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text. It should be reiterated, 
however, that as long as alimony is need-based and tied to spousal support there may be a 
justification for terminating alimony on remarriage. But to the extent alimony is based on a 
different rationale, such as the economic-damages rationale, that original rationale for awarding 
alimony would not suggest that termination of payments upon marriage would be warranted. 
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imagine an alimony recipient who would go to the trouble of alerting 
her former partner that she needs less alimony. 
Although one plausible reason for the automatic-termination 
rule is to encourage remarriage, that explanation fails to recognize 
two fundamental differences between cohabitation and marriage. 
First, unmarried cohabitants do not assume the legal duties of 
married couples.231 Indeed, as one state supreme court noted, “[t]he 
length of [the cohabiting] relationship is unknown . . . . [A]ny support 
[the ex-spouse] may receive from her cohabitant is provided from his 
benevolence and comes with no reciprocal or continuing 
obligation.”232 Thus, when a cohabiting relationship ends, the ex-
spouse is generally left without a remedy. Second, the 
encouragement-of-remarriage explanation ignores the social-science 
research that distinguishes cohabitation from marriage. Cohabiting 
relationships are generally of short duration,233 and cohabitants may 
not share economic expenses to a greater extent than do mere 
roommates.234 
Further, automatic-termination rules are overly broad. The 
Kentucky Supreme Court feared that an automatic-termination rule 
could “open the floodgates to motions to terminate or suspend 
maintenance payments in every situation in which the maintenance 
recipient has begun dating, or has formed casual relationships with 
persons of the opposite sex.”235 The increasing prevalence of 
cohabiting relationships that do not materially affect an alimony 
recipient’s underlying financial need would threaten to call a great 
number of alimony awards into question.236 To constitute changed 
circumstances, the cohabiting relationship should actually approach 
the permanency of a marital relationship instead of more closely 
resembling a more casual dating relationship.237 
 
 231. In re Marriage of Dwyer, 825 P.2d 1018, 1019 (Colo. App. 1991). 
 232. Cermak v. Cermak, 569 N.W.2d 280, 284 (N.D. 1997). As the Nevada Supreme Court 
noted, “[b]ecause no legal support obligation is imposed on the parties during the relationship, 
no spousal maintenance can be awarded when and if the relationship ends. Moreover, absent an 
express or implied agreement to the contrary, no quasi-marital property rights accrue as a result 
of cohabitation.” Gilman v. Gilman, 956 P.2d 761, 765 (Nev. 1998) (citation omitted). 
 233. See supra notes 107–109 and accompanying text. 
 234. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 235. Combs v. Combs, 787 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Ky. 1990). 
 236. Miller v. Miller, 892 A.2d 175, 182 (Vt. 2005). 
 237. Id. Courts can decide whether the cohabiting relationship actually approaches the 
permanency of a marital relationship on a case-by-case basis. 
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Nor would maintaining separate rules for separate types of 
relationships likely contribute to a substantial erosion of the 
institution of marriage.238 Other means of financial assistance—such as 
certain social-security and pension benefits—treat married people 
and cohabitants differently,239 and the institution of marriage remains 
strong. 
Finally, automatic termination of alimony payments upon a 
finding of cohabitation has a “distinct punitive aspect.”240 Merely 
living together does not suffice in other contexts, such as when an ex-
spouse moves in with a platonic roommate or with family members.241 
As the New Jersey Supreme Court noted, automatic termination 
“imposes upon a former wife the obligation to lead a chaste life lest 
she forfeit her alimony payments in whole or in part.”242 Alimony 
should not be awarded as a reward or penalty, but instead should 
rectify economic imbalances between the former spouses.243 
B. Clearly Defining What Constitutes Cohabitation and Diminished 
Need 
When courts and legislatures rely on a need-based theory for 
alimony, their responses to the cohabitation question should reflect 
that policy. They should define cohabitation and diminished need 
precisely in order to capture the types of relationships that, under a 
need-based theory, warrant alimony modification. Precise definitions 
will promote consistency and predictability within jurisdictions. 
Unclear definitions, by contrast, could lead judges in similar cases to 
 
 238. See Bowman, supra note 101, at 43 (“[O]ffering legal recognition and support to 
cohabitants and making their lives easier does not appear to discourage marriage, and in fact the 
opposite may be true.”). 
 239. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 240. Garlinger v. Garlinger, 347 A.2d 799, 802 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975). 
 241. See Twila L. Perry, The “Essentials of Marriage”: Reconsidering the Duty of Support 
and Services, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 27 (2003) (“An ex-husband’s protest that his ex-wife 
is living with her sister, or even with her best friend would also likely fall on deaf ears. The fact 
is that the inquiry as to whether an ex-wife still ‘needs’ the alimony is usually only triggered in 
the event that she begins to live with a member of the opposite sex to whom the court assumes 
that she is now providing marital-type services.”). But see In re Marriage of Sappington, 478 
N.E.2d 376, 380, 382 (Ill. 1985) (terminating the ex-wife’s alimony because her relationship with 
her roommate was more akin to that of a husband and wife than of casual friends although the 
couple denied having a sexual relationship or any romantic feelings). 
 242. Garlinger, 347 A.2d at 802. 
 243. Drummond v. Drummond, 590 S.W.2d 658, 661 (Ark. 1979). 
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reach different conclusions about whether parties cohabited or 
whether an alimony recipient’s need has diminished. 
1. Cohabitation. Courts and legislatures must define carefully 
what constitutes cohabitation. Without a workable test, judges may 
make determinations that do not have a reasonable theoretical basis 
or that do not reflect the social-science data on cohabitation. Unclear 
definitions risk unpredictable and inconsistent awards as well as 
moral, rather than legal, judgments. Indeed, courts sometimes reach 
absurd results.244 
The definition of cohabitation should turn on whether the couple 
acts like a family unit. Courts should thus ask whether the 
cohabitation resembles a marriage. Although not perfect, the 
“marriage-like” test is a reasonable proxy. This approach 
acknowledges the interest in protecting the institution of marriage 
and highlights relationships that are most likely to include economic 
interdependence. 
Although this definition affords courts some flexibility, it 
excludes dating relationships that likely do not result in diminished 
need and instead only captures the type of supportive relationship 
that resembles a serious long-term commitment akin to marriage. 
Under this definition, simply sleeping together and moving back and 
forth between residences does not suffice because this type of 
relationship does not suggest permanency and mutual financial 
support. And mere roommate relationships do not suffice; indeed, 
courts and legislatures should not penalize alimony recipients for 
their attempts to save money by reducing their living expenses.245 
There are two reasons to adopt this definition, which excludes 
relationships that some courts currently classify as cohabitation. First, 
social-science data indicate that non-marital cohabitation is often 
fluid and usually lasts only a few years.246 And scholars agree that 
cohabitants support each other to a lesser extent than do married 
couples.247 If the reason judges should modify alimony is diminished 
need, some relationships that are loosely classified as cohabitation do 
not fit the bill. Second, cohabitants generally do not incur a legal duty 
 
 244. See supra notes 199–201 and accompanying text. 
 245. The Vermont Supreme Court has applied this logic. See supra note 217 and 
accompanying text. 
 246. See supra notes 107–109 and accompanying text. 
 247. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
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to support each other either during or after their relationship.248 
Cohabitants thus do not have the same duty to support one another 
as do married couples. The definition of cohabitation should account 
for these realities and capture a subset of cohabiting relationships, not 
all of them. 
Under the marriage-like test, sexual conduct is perhaps helpful in 
determining whether two people under the same roof are more than 
roommates, but it is not dispositive. Requiring a sexual relationship 
for a finding of cohabitation may penalize the ex-spouse for her post-
divorce private behavior. Even if looking at sexual conduct during the 
marriage is appropriate, sexual conduct is not “meretricious” or 
“illicit” after the divorce.249 After the marriage ends, any obligation of 
fidelity terminates as well. The better inquiry is thus whether the 
couple has a sexual or otherwise intimate, romantic relationship that 
looks like the equivalent of a common-law marriage. When the focus 
is on economic need, the inquiry should focus on permanency and 
financial support, and courts should avoid penalizing post-divorce 
sexual conduct. 
2. Diminished need. Only cohabitation that results in an actual 
decrease in financial need should affect alimony. The research on 
cohabitants’ economic interdependence conflicts somewhat, but the 
consensus is that cohabitants financially support each other to a lesser 
extent than do married couples.250 Vermont’s approach to financial 
need thus makes sense: merely sharing household expenses should 
not suffice to modify alimony.251 Such inquiries are nitpicky and 
unnecessarily intrusive. Alimony recipients should not be forced to 
live in isolation, and they should be allowed to share household 
expenses as they would with roommates without penalty. And 
contrary to the holdings of some courts,252 the fact that an ex-spouse 
occasionally pays for a cohabitant’s groceries or other small expenses 
does not mean that her financial need has diminished. Establishing 
that cohabitants are economically interdependent should require 
more than merely showing that they share the type of financial 
relationships that ordinary roommates often do. 
 
 248. See supra notes 138–139 and accompanying text. 
 249. See supra notes 132–136 and accompanying text. 
 250. See supra notes 119–120 and accompanying text. 
 251. See supra notes 216–217 and accompanying text. 
 252. See supra notes 214–215 and accompanying text. 
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Although cohabitants are less likely to become economically 
interdependent than are married couples, a rebuttable presumption 
that financial needs have changed may work best in practice.253 
Cohabitants could easily hide evidence of changed financial 
circumstances, which could make proving that an alimony recipient’s 
needs have diminished very difficult for the other ex-spouse. Yet this 
presumption should not be too difficult to overcome. To rebut the 
presumption, an alimony recipient could provide evidence that the 
couple does not have joint bank accounts, that they pay bills 
separately, and that she does not receive financial assistance beyond a 
typical roommate relationship. Finally, if cohabitation has occurred 
and the recipient’s needs have indeed diminished, the court should 
only modify alimony to the extent of the diminished need. 
C. Providing for Alimony’s Reinstatement 
Courts should at most suspend—not terminate—alimony and 
should retain jurisdiction for the length of the original alimony 
term.254 They should reinstate alimony payments for the duration of 
the original term if the former alimony recipient can establish that she 
is no longer cohabiting and is no longer retaining any benefits from 
her former cohabitant. 
Reinstatement corresponds to two realities. First, cohabitation 
generally lasts for at most a few years.255 Second, cohabitants 
generally do not incur a legal duty to support each other after their 
relationship ends.256 These facts indicate that even if an ex-spouse is 
financially supported by her cohabitant, she will likely lose that 
support when the relationship ends. Because cohabitants do not incur 
a legal duty to support each other, a rule that fails to account for 
reinstatement could leave former alimony recipients who were 
awarded alimony on the basis of need in precarious financial 
circumstances. Reinstatement better protects alimony recipients than 
does a termination rule. 
The alimony recipient, however, should bear the burden of 
proving both that she is no longer cohabiting and no longer retaining 
 
 253. A few states already apply a rebuttable presumption in this manner. See supra note 220 
and accompanying text. 
 254. Massachusetts recently adopted this approach. See supra notes 176–179 and 
accompanying text. 
 255. See supra notes 107–109 and accompanying text. 
 256. See supra notes 138–139 and accompanying text. 
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any economic benefits from her former cohabitant in order to receive 
a reinstatement of alimony payments. This assignment of the burden 
of proof respects the supporting spouse and the fact that he is not in 
the best position to know whether the former alimony recipient 
retains economic support from her cohabiting relationship. It also 
respects the limited resources of courts. Setting a high bar for the 
former alimony recipient will likely decrease the number of 
unwarranted suits. Moreover, the fact that most alimony awards last 
for only a few years—as opposed to a lifetime—also limits the 
potential for this rule to overwhelm the courts with requests to 
reinstate alimony.257 Finally, because judges make and modify awards 
in equity,258 they can prevent unjust results. 
CONCLUSION 
With the dramatic rise in prevalence and acceptance of 
cohabitation, its impact on alimony payments deserves immediate 
attention from courts and legislatures. Although different states can, 
and perhaps should, tailor their responses to the cohabitation 
question based on state policy choices, there are certain underlying 
principles that should be applicable given the various theories of 
alimony and the social-science data on cohabitation. This Note 
provides an initial framework for a sensible, workable set of rules that 
respects both ex-spouses. In doing so, it offers three principal 
suggestions. First, cohabitation should only affect alimony awards 
based on need. Second, courts and legislatures should define 
cohabitation and need precisely to capture relationships that 
resemble the permanency and mutual financial support of marriage. 
And third, courts should at most suspend, not terminate, alimony in 
cases of diminished financial need. Although these clarifications do 
not answer every aspect of the cohabitation question, this Note seeks 
to spark necessary discussion and reform. The social landscape has 
changed, and it is time for the law to follow. 
 
 257. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 258. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
